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One hypothesis about why large and small firms coexist in many
industries is that entrepreneurialability determinesfirm size. More able
entrepreneurs managefirms whose sizes vary more than proportionately
with their talents. However, because largerfirms alsoface higher costs
(per worker) in monitoring worker performance, they have more spe-
cialized methods ofproduction, require more specialized training and
hire more skilledworkers to economize on monitoring. Empirical results
tend to confirm this hypothesis. Moreover, the evidence implies that
significant economic losses may be associated with public policies that
prohibitfirmsfrom attaining their optimum size.
Many industries are characterized by the coexist-
ence of finns of widely varying size, often with
output concentrated in a few large finns. Under-
standing why this is so is extremely important for
regulatory and antitrustpolicy.
On the one hand, it is widely believed that a high
concentrationofoutput (that is, a positively skewed
distribution offinn size) leads to reduced competi-
tion. lOne of the rationales for the regulation of
many industries is to reduce concentration, prevent
increased concentration, or to restrict how finns in
J:oncentrated industries may operate, especially
/ those that are believed to be natural monopolies.
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itrust law also grew out of a concern with con-
ation and may have had substantial effects on
m t structure through the prohibition of mer-
gers,i;~nd until recently, suits aimed at breaking up
successful large businesses.
3 Regulation in indus-
tries such as trucking, airlines, rail transportation
and banking, may also have had significant effects
on the finn-size distribution in these industries. For
example, in banking, various restrictions on geo-
graphic competition, such as prohibitions against
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interstate banking, may have resulted in less con-
centrated market structures.
On the other hand, there is a concern about the
potential costsofpreventing finns from operating at
their most efficient oroptimal scales. Forexample,
breaking up a large finn into several smaller ones,
or prohibiting the merger of smaller firms, may
have substantial costs if there are economies of
scale. Thus, possible anti-competitiveeffectsdue to
concentration should be balanced against possible
increases in productive efficiency in fonnulating
regulatory orantitrust policy.
Forexample, some economists have argued for a
repeal ofthe antitrust laws so that the United States
can compete mory effectively with Japan.
4 Propo-
sals for the elimination of restrictions on interstate
banking are also often based on the notion that a
more efficient provision of services would result
and benefit consumers. Opponents to this type of
deregulation are concerned that the elimination of
restrictions would lead to a more concentrated
banking industry with less competition.
Until recently, there was no theory of finn-size
that was able simultaneously to explain actual finn-
size distributions and several empirical regularities
in production associated with finn-size. However,
new developments in economictheory thatfocus on
entrepreneurial ability as a fixed factor of produc-tion and on the organization ofproduction are cap"
able ofexplainingfirm"size distributions anddiffer"
ences in production methods among different"sized
firms. In this paper, these new theories are re"
viewed, some of their implications for differences
in production are tested indirectly, and the public
policy implications are explored. The empirical
analysis focuses on differences in the employment
practices among different"sized firms, in particular,
differences in wage levels, wage growth and tum"
over. Hopefully, the results provide useful evidence
about the determinants of the distribution of firm"
size so that public policies aimed at influencing
market structure can be better informed.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In
Section I, I review the implications of neoclassical
theory regarding firm"size distributions and present
evidence that contradicts these implications. Next,
in Section II, several new developments in eco"
nomic theory explaining the determinants of firm
size are reviewed and their empirical implications
regarding differences between various characteris-
tics ofthe labor forces of large and small firms are
discussed. Then, in Section III, empirical evidence
is presented that tends to support these hypotheses.
Finally, the summary and conclusions are presented
along with policy implications.
I. Neoclassical Theory and Facts
To analyze the determinants ofthe firm-size dis-
tribution, it is first necessary to define what a firm is
and explain why firms exist. Our current under-
standing ofwhat firms are and why they exist is due
to Coase (1937), who hypothesized that economic
activity takes place in firms instead of markets
because ofthe transactions costs involved in organ-
izing economic activities in markets. A firm substi-
tutes a command-and-control system for the alloca-
tion of resources that could have been achieved
through the market economy. Presumably, an eco-
nomic activity (production) takes place within a
firm ifit is less costly than if it took place using the
market. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) extended this
basic concept by emphasizing the importance of
group or team production. Group production im-
plies the need for monitoring workers because the
separate contribution of each iIlf.iividual cannot be
assessed simply by observing ~~tput. Thus, group
production might be very diffj''Sl1lt to achieve in a
market setting.
Ifentrepreneurs in a given competitive industry
have available the same technology of production,
face the same relative prices for transactions within
the firm and outside, andface identical input prices,
all firms in the industry (that is, firms producing the
same products) would have identical cost functions.
Assuming V-shaped average cost functions, all
firms would produce at the minimum point on their
average cost curves and the numberoffirms would
equal total market demand (at a price equal to mini-
mum average cost)divided by the outputofa typical
firm at its minimum average cost. Thus, if such
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conditions held, all firms in an industry would be
the same size. 5
However, even casual observation contradicts
the notion that all firms in an industry are the same
size. For example, in banking, the size distribution
is positively skewed and the variance in firm-size is
very large (with a standard deviation approximately
four times the mean), with firms ranging in size
from those with less than $5 million in assets to
those with over$100 billion. Furthermore, the rela-
tive variance offirm-size in many otherindustries is
even larger, and the skewness of the size distribu-
tion function in banking is considerably less than
that in many other industries.
To analyze the extent to which industry type can
explain firm-size, I have estimated the fraction of
the overall variance in firm-size that is explained by
industry type. The variance in firm-size is analyzed
using three regressions of firm size on
2-digit, and 4-digitSIC (Standard Industrial
fication) codes. The regressions are ofthe toJllQJwulg
general form:
SIZE, = A + Lj Bj SICij + e j (I)
where: SIZE; = the size offirm i, measured at
the establishment level, in terms
ofnumberofworkers,
SIC;j = a set ofdummy variables indi-
cating whether firm i is in the
Standard Industrial Classification
code (SIC) category j,
ei = a random error term.The data for these regressions are from an em-
ployersurveyofover5000establishments. 6 (Estab-
lishments are defined as places ofbusiness regard-
less of ownership, and thus differ from firms.)
Establishment-level data are used (as opposed to
firm-level data), and since the overall variance in
establishment size is probably less than the variance
in firm-size because some firms are comprised of
many establishments, the variance in establishment
size within an industry is probably less than the
variance in firm-size.
The regressions indicate that the SIC code ex-
plains 6 percent at the I-digit level, 14 percent at the
2-digit level, and 47 percent at the 4-digit level of
the variance in establishmentsize. Thus, even at the
4-digit level, over 50 percent of the variance in
establishment size is within industries, and this may
be an understatementsince in some cases the 4-digit
SIC code level may be too detailed in disaggre-
gating firms that are really in the same industry. 7
These regression results do support the hypo-
thesis that production technology (and hence, in-
dustry) is relatedto firm-size because firm-size does
depend on industry, but they also strongly suggest
that other factors must be responsible for the large
within-industry variation in firm size. One reason
may be that average cost functions are not U-shaped
but flat, exhibiting constant returns to scale over a
wide range, perhaps with initial economies ofscale
(and declining average costs) over only a relatively
small initial interval. x This type of cost function
would imply a rectangular distribution of firms
within the flat portion ofthe average cost function,
since firms outside this range would be unlikely to
survive (because oftheir higher average costs), and
because within the range there is no reason for any
particularsize to be observed more frequently.
However, this implication ofneoclassical theory
is also contradicted by the data: the distribution of
firm-size within industry is highly skewed, not rec-
tangular. For example, in Chart I, the distribution
of firm-size in the banking industry shows a highly
skeweddistribution with a long right tail, and distri-
butions in most industries are very similar. 9
One attempt to reconcile this skewness with neo-
classical theory is the application of stochastic
models to the growth of individual firms. Much of
this analysis is derived from the work of Gibrat
(1931), who showed that ifall firms have an equal
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chance ofgrowing (or declining) by a given percen-
tage amount, then a log normal size distribution of
firms will result even if all firms are initially the
same size. There does seem to be evidence that the
growth of firms is independent of size, as well as
evidence that, at least for some industries, the
observed distribution is log normal. This theory of
the firm-size distribution, taken literally, implies
that there are no differences in production techno-
logies of firms of different sizes (in the same
industry), that average costs are independent of
size, and that the existing size distribution at any
moment in time is simply due to the cumulative
effects of luck (random factors). That is, there
should be no systematic differences between large
and small firms since they have the same cost func-
tions, and since differences in size are due only to
random shocks.
Because this theory implies that the size distribu-
tion of firms under competition is due simply to
randomness, one very important policy implication
is that there would be no losses in economic effi-
ciency with the dissolution of large firms, oroppo-
sition to the consolidation of smaller firms through
mergers, as long as firms were operating on the flat
portion of their average cost curves. For example,
interstate banking could be prohibited without any
concern for possible losses in output due to an
Chart 1
Distribution of Firm Size
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Table 104.inefficient scale of operation. Furthermore, since
less concentrated industries may be more competi-
tive, one need not worry aboutbalancing gainsfrom
increased competition against losses due to non-
optimal size when breaking up large firms or pro-
hibiting mergers. Much of the empirical evidence
presented in this paper, however, shows that there
are many systematic differences between large and
small firms that cannot be explained by purely
statistical models offirm size.
II. New Explanations of the Firm-Size Distribution
To explain differences in firm size, recent theo-
retical research has emphasized differences in
entrepreneurial ability, which is assumed to be in
perfectly inelastic supply. For example, Lucas
(1978) developed a model in which individuals are
alike as workers butdiffer in entrepreneurial ability.
In his model, the distribution of entrepreneurial
ability leads to an equilibrium distribution of firm
size, with more able entrepreneurs running larger
firms.
Rosen (1981a, b, 1982) also developed a model in
which entrepreneurial ability explains the size
distribution of firms. His model focuses on the
hierarchical structure of production in firms where
decisions at each level of the hierarchy affect the
efficiency of labor inputs at the next lower level.
This production technology implies that there is a
multiplicative effect in assigning persons of super-
ior talent to the top ranks because they increase
productivity by more than the increments of their
talents. A more productive chiefexecutive officer,
for example, affects the productivity of everyone
below him orher in the organization, and thus even
a small increment in his or her talent may have a
very large overall effect on productivity. Even if
entrepreneurial ability were distributed normally,
the firm-size distribution would be skewed because,
in equilibrium, this production technology implies
that output and labor input rise more than propor-
tionately with talent.
These same characteristics of production imply
that managerial compensation rises more than pro-
portionately with ability. This, in turn, implies a
skewed distribution of compensation as well, a
finding confirmed by the work of Roberts (1956)
and Fox (1978), who both find managerial com-
pensation varying with the log of the number of
employees. The reason this type ofproduction tech-
nology does not lead to an equilibrium in which
there is only one firm managed by the most talented
individual (at least in each industry) is that the
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economies due to the hierarchical organization are
limited by the increasing costs ofmonitoring work-
ers. Monitoring workers requires direct workercon-
tact and, therefore, is not subjectto the samesortsof
scale economies as the coordination and allocation
ofresources.
Rosen's model has some interesting implications
for the structure of firms' cost functions. First, in
equilibrium, any given firm will be subject to
increasingaverage costs ifitexpandsoutputbeyond
its equilibrium level, holding managerial talent
constant. Second, firms ofdifferent sizes, in equil-
ibrium, may well have identical measured average
costs because the economies realized by the larger
firm due to its superior management talent will be
captured by the management whose talent is as-
sumed to be in perfectly inelastic supply and
because managers' compensation is often recorded
as a cost, not a profit. Thus, evidence thatmeasured
average costs are independent offirm size does not
necessarily imply that breaking up large firms
would not result in significant economic losses.
Rosen's model offirm size implies quite the oppo-
site: there are economic benefits from allowing man-
agers with superiortalent to manage larger firms.
Oi (1982a, b) also developeda modelthatempha-
sizes entrepreneurial ability, but Oi's model more
fully develops the implications ofmonitoring costs.
His model, like Rosen's, assumes entrepreneurs
perform two functions: they coordinate production
and they monitor the performance of workers, but
Oi does not assume a hierarchical production tech-
nology and thus Oi's model is unable to explain the
skewed distribution offirm size in most industries.
In Oi'smodel, more able entrepreneurs are assumed
to be more productive at coordination but all entre-
preneurs are assumed to be equally productive at
monitoring. Although it might seem somewhat ar-
bitrary to assume more able coordinators are not
also more able monitors, Rosen's model of hier-
archical production suggests why this might be so.A more efficient monitor cannot reap the same sort
of efficiencies in monitoring that he or she can in
making coordinating and aliocative decisions
because monitoring cannot be delegated in a hier-
archical structure.
Since an increase in entrepreneurial talent leads
to an increase in the number of employees, and
more employees implies more time spent monitor-
ing and less time spent making coordinating and
allocative decisions, the implicit costs of monitor-
ing worker performance should be higher in larger
firms. They should be higher because the alterna-
tive use of time is coordination (or allocation of
resources), for which there are economies ofscale
implicit in hierarchical organizations and because
of the lack ofsuch scale economies in monitoring.
These scale economies make coordination more
valuable in large firms, and, as Rosen points out,
this strengthens the implicationthatfirm size will be
skewed because superior managerial talent can be
economized by "subordinating" monitoring
through a more hierarchical structure.
The dependence ofmonitoring costs on firm size
means that firms ofdifferent sizes will have differ-
ent types of workers, different types of managers.
different types of capital, and different sorts of
production methods. Thus, this new theory stands
in sharp contrast to the stochastic explanations of
the firm-size distribution that predict no systematic
structural differences among firms of different
sizes. Forexample, the monitoring-cost hypothesis
predicts that large firms should have more hierarch-
ical structures, less flexible production methods
(which are presumably associated with less moni-
toring), more reliable workers (who require less
monitoring), and more reliable capital equipment
(which requires fewer repairs and therefore less
monitoring ofworkers who perform the repairs).
The monitoring-cost hypothesis has several em-
pirical implications. First, it implies that larger
firms invest in more specific human capital (that is.
skills specific to the firm) than small firms because
larger firms have higher costs per worker in moni-
toring worker performance. These higher monitor-
ing costs lead larger firms to have more rigid and
specialized methods of production, which in tum
require more firm-specific training (that is, specific
human capital). Since large firms find it optimal to
invest in more specific human capital than small
firms, turnover rates (both quit and fire/layoffrates)
should be lower in large firms.
. Second, this theory implies that large firms will
hire more productive employees-that is, employ-
ees with higher levels of human capital (which
depends on commonly measured variables such as
education as well as traits such as intelligence or
reliability that are more difficult to measure). This
is the case because more productive workers allow
firms to lower monitoring costs per unit of output
and thus to economize on those costs, assuming that
they depend on the numberofworkers and not total
output.
Below, we present some indirect tests of these
hypotheses by estimating differences in wage
levels, wage growth, and turnover among firms of
different sizes and types.
III. Empirical Evidence on the Monitoring-Cost Hypothesis
The monitoring-cost hypothesis implies that
large firms invest more in specific human capital
than small firms because large firms have higher
costs (per worker) of monitoring worker perfor-
mance. These higher monitoring costs lead large
firms to institute rigid and specialized methods of
pr?dnction, which, in tum, require more special-
izedtraining. Thishypothesisalso implies that large
firms hire workers with more general human capital
in order to reduce the costs (per unit ofoutput) of
monitoring, assuming that monitoring costs depend
on the number of workers and not total output.
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Although specific and general human capital are not
directly observable, wage rates, wage growth and
turnoverare. Thus, one can test the monitoring-cost
hypothesis indirectly by analyzing these observable
variables. Below, Ifirst discuss the implications for
wage levels.
According to human capital theory, (see Becker
(1964)), wage rates depend on general and specific
human capital. General human capital is a set of
skills and knowledge that can be transferred from
one employer to another, while specific human
capital is a set of skills and knowledge that areuseful only in a specific finn. Since this theory
predicts that wage levels differ among finns of
different sizes because ofdifferences in human cap-
ital, to analyze the implications ofthe monitoring-
cost hypothesis for differences in wage rates one
needs to assess its implications for human capital.
General human capital is, by definition, equally
valuable in any finn. Workers are therefore expec-
ted to bear the full costs ofacquiring general human
capital since they take their general human capital
with them when they leave the finn. Ifsuch general
human capital is acquired on the job, then observed
earnings would be net of investment costs (that is,
observed earnings would equal the potential mar-
ginal product minus the costs to the employer of
providing general training). Since such general
human capital is equally valuable at all finns,
workers must be paid the full retum on any invest-
ments in such capital (or they will leave and find
employment in a new finn).
The allocation of costs and returns between
employer and employee of specific and general
human capital is quite different. Since specific
human capital is only valuable in the finn where it is
acquired, this type ofcapitalcompletelydepreciates
when the worker leaves the finn. Thus, ifthe finn
had entirely bome the costs and received the bene-
fits of such investments, the finn would lose its
investment ifa workerquit. Similarly, ifthe worker
paid the entire cost of the investment and received
the full benefitand then was fired, the workerwould
lose his capital. Becker shows that such considera-
tions lead workers and finns to share in the costs and
benefits ofinvestments in specific hum~~;capital to
ensure that both decisions to fire and t~yquit take
into account the loss of specific human.~apital that
would result. 10
To summarize, human capital theory implies that
observed wages depend on (opportunity) marginal
products, II the amount of training currently being
undertaken, and the share ofthe training costs being
paid implicitly by the worker. Highermarginal pro-
ducts lead to higher wages as do lower workers'
shares of training costs (because workers pay for
their training implicitly with lower wages) and
greater amounts of on-the-job general or specific
training (holding constant the share ofcosts thatare
borne by the worker) lead to lower wages. Thus, all
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otherthings being equal, a given amount ofspecific
training will lead to higher observed current wages
than the same amount of general training because
only afraction ofspecific training costs are borne by
the worker. Marginal products, of course, depend
on the accumulation ofhuman capital, and the share
of the marginal product being paid to the worker
depends on the share of the training costs that are
borne by the worker. Wage levels thus may differ
among tinns ofdifferent sizes and types because of
differences in the levels of their workers' general
and specific human capital and differences in the
provision ofcurrent general and specific training. 12
Workers with more general humancapital require
less monitoring per unit of output if monitoring
costs depend on the numberofworkers and nottotal
output, orifthere are other aspects ofproduction in
which managers' and workers' skill levels com-
plement each other. Large firms thus should
be more likely to hire highly skilled workers than
small finns; that is, there should be a positive
matching ofmore able entrepreneurs with more able
workers. This consideration alone implies that
larger finns would pay higher wages. However, if
large finns provided sufficiently more training and
this training were paid for by employees, such a
training effect could conceivably offset the higher
wages in large finns due to the greaterskill levels of
their employees.
Whether large finns would provide more on-the-
job general training than small finns depends on
whether training activities require more monitoring
than production activities because large finns face
higher monitoring costs. It seems likely that such
training does require much individual attention
(monitoring). If so, large finns would simply hire
workers with more general training that had been
acquired elsewhere. This lower rate of general
human capital accumulation would lead to even
greater wage differences between large and small
finns. Although large finns are expected to offer
more specific training (\vhich would depressob-
served wages somewhat), it is unlikely this would
dominate the higher wages large finns pay due to
higher skill levels and their practice of Ptoviding
less general training. Thus, on balance, large firms
are expectedto pay higherwages. Below,this hypo-
thesis is tested.Analysis of Firm Size on Wage Levels
To test the hypothesis that wage rates are higher
in large firms, the following sorts of models were
estimated:
where: Inw is the natural log ofan employee's wage
rate, C is a vectorofcontrol variables, Dj = I ifthe
job is ofthe ithtype (i = I,..., 4), and. the As and
Bs are parameters to be estimated. In this analysis,
wage rates are defined as earnings divided by hours
of work, and include tips, bonuses and commis-
sions but not fringe benefits. (There were no mea-
sures of fringe benefits in the EOPP household
Data and Samples
The data analyzed come from the Employment
Opportunity Pilot Projects (EOPP) baseline house-
hold and employer surveys. These surveys were
designed to obtain pre-program measures ofa vari-
ety of variables, such as wage rates, earnings,
employment, and unemploymentas partoftheeval-
uation of EOPP. 13 The household survey covered
the period January I, 1979 through the date of the
interview (most interviews occurred between May
and September 1980).14
The household survey was conducted in 10 pilot
and 10 matching control sites throughout the U.S.;
and the employer survey was conducted in 10 pilot
sites and 19 control sites. The employer and house-
hold surveys have in common 7 pilot and 7 match-
ing control sites where the two surveys are linked.
The linked surveys are used when analyzing the
household data since firm size comes from the
employersurvey. 15
When analyzing differences among firms ofdif-
ferent types and sizes in wage levels, wage growth,
and turnover, all firms are classified into one offive
types:
Large private business (an establishment with
500 or more employees)




Special government-(CETA, WIN, EOPP,
Manpoweroryouth program)
Inw = A" + AIC + BIDI + B2 D2
+B 3 D 3 +B4 D4 +e (2)
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survey.) Three different specifications of this
model, with different control sets, were estimated:
one with no control variables, one with a set of
2-digit SIC industry dummies, and one with the
same industrydummiesand othercontrol variables.
In the model with no control variables, Bi mea-
sures the mean difference in the natural log of the
wage rate between category i and small private
businesses (the excludedcategory). The natural-log
specification is used since it fits somewhat better
than a linear model, and because the coefficients
can be interpreted as percentage effects (ifthey are
small). 10 Industry control variables are included to
control for possible differences in wages that might
be correlated with firm size across industries. It
should be noted that the coefficient estimates ofthe
government category, when industry dummies are
included, cannot be easily interpreted sincegovern-
ment employment is largely but not entirely cap-
tured in SIC codes 91 through 97.
Finally, the complete set ofcontrol variables are
added to hold observable differences in the charac-
teristics of the individuals and their employers
constant. These control variables are described in
Appendix A: they include not only the usual human
capital variables (education, experience, demo-
graphic characteristics) but also dummies for occu-
pation ofthe worker and whether the worker was a
union member. Finally, there are a number of site
characteristics (unemployment rate and SMSA
size). This control set is far more comprehensive
than those normally available. 17
In Table I, the estimated coefficients of these
models are presented for four demographic groups.
The results from the specification with no control
variables indicate that for all groups, workers in
large private businesses receive considerably higher
wage rates than workers in small privatebusinesses.
The effects are large and statistically significant for
all groups, indicating that employees oflarge firms
earn between 17 and40 percent(exp..16 = I. 17 and
expo .34 = 1.40) more than workers in small private
businesses. This table also shows some statistically
significantdifferences for othertypesofemployers,
with government workers earning less than workers
in small private businesses for married men and
youth, but earning more in the case of married
women and single female heads. (F Tests of the
joint significance of the four firm-size-and-typevariables presented in Table I indicate they are
jointly significant at the I% level or better.)
Likewise, special government workers eamless-
probably an indication ofthe low-paying nature of
these special jobs. Self-employed married men and
women eam significantly less than their counter-
parts in small private businesses, but there are no
statistically significant differences for self-employ-
ed single female heads and youth.
These results strongly confirm the hypothesis
that workers in large firms are paid more than
workers in small firms. 18 These results affirm those
of other researchers [see Schiller (1982), Mellow
(1981), and Oi (1982)].
When industry-control variables are included,
the results show similar, although generally some-
what smaller, effects. F tests indicate one can reject
the hypothesis that industry has no effect on wages,
holding firm size constant. This is not surprising
since different industries probably have workers
with different skill levels and, hence, different
wages.
The results with the complete set ofcontrol vari-
ables are generally similar except that estimated
wage differences are smaller, ranging from 10 to 15
percent depending on the demographic group.
However, all estimated differences between large
and small private businesses are statisticallysignifi-
cant at the I percent level orbetter, exceptfor youth
for whomthe effectsare significantatthe 5% level.
These results show that large firms do hire
workers with higherlevels ofgeneral human capital
(since the inclusion of the human-capital control
variables leads to smallerdifferences) than do small
firms, but they also show that, even controlling for
industry type and a large number of observable
differences between the employees of large and
small businesses, large businesses pay significantly
higher wages. These results are consistent with the
monitoring-cost hypothesis that large firms hire
more productive workers, both in terms of higher
levels of measurable characteristics and factors
such as intelligence that are not observed. This
would explain the smaller wage differences when
12all control variables are included, as well as the
persistence of significant wage differences even
after controlling for many factors.
However, the results also would be consistent
with the idea that lowerlevels ofspecific orgeneral
training are being provided by large firms (whose
costs are partially or fully borne by workers), al-
though our theory predicts the opposite: that large
firms provide more specific and less general train-
ing than small firms. Since training leads to more
rapid wage growth, we can test this alternative
theory by analyzing wage growth.
Firm Size and Type and Wage
Growth on the Job
Real wage growth on a particularjob, according
to human capital theory, is due to the accumulation
of human capital. More rapid human capital accu-
mulation that is paid for by the employee leads to
more rapid wage growth. Although we expect large
firms to provide more specific training, they would
provide less general training if providing general
training requires relatively more monitoring than
otheractivities. Thus, there is no strong priorreason
to expectdifferences in wage growth between small
and large firms since the more rapid wage growth in
large firms due to the higher rate ofspecific human
capital accumulation may be fully orpartiallyoffset
by less rapid general human capital accumulation.
Starting and ending wage rates for hourly work-
ers are used to analyze wage growth on a particular
job. (For salaried employees, however, no measure
of wage growth on the job is available, so such
workers are excluded.) The empirical models
employed to analyze wage growth are very similar
to those used to analyze wage levels. Theyare ofthe
general form:
In (we/w)/length = Ao+A,C+B,O, +B2 0 2
+ B3 0 3 + B4 0 4 + e (3)
where: ws = starting wage rate
We = ending wage rate
13length = length ofthe period (in years)
over which the starting and
ending wages are measured, and
the Dis, Ais, Bis and C are
defined as before.
The model therefore measures the relative wage
growth of various sizes and types of employers
compared to small private businesses. The same
three specifications ofthe control set that were used
in the wage-level regressions also are used here.
The estimates of this wage-growth model are
presented in Table 2. When no control variables are
included, there are no statistically significantdiffer-
ences in the rate ofwage growth between small and
large firms, with the exception ofthe youth d~m~­
graphic group. Foryouth, wage growth on theJob ~s
greater in large businesses. The only pattern that IS
consistent across demographic groups is a lower
rate ofgrowth for special government jobs.
Estimates using industry control variables only
and estimates using industry, human capital and
additional control variables for the reason the job
spell ended, if it ended (quit, laidoff, orfired) were
not significantly different from those using no con-
trol variables. The one difference was that they
showed no significant differences between large
and small private businesses for youth.
Since wage growth does not appear to differ
significantly between large and small firms, to the
extent that large firms provide more specific train-
ing (which is paid for by employees) than small
firms (which would lead to more rapid wage growth
in large firms), it must be offset by less general
training being provided by large firms. These re-
sults, along with the existence ofhigherwage levels
in large firms, suggest that such firms are hiring
more highly skilled workers (in terms ofboth mea-
surable and unmeasurable characteristics), and that
observed wage differences are due to differences in
skill levels and not differences in on-the-job human
capital accumulation. Also, if large firms do pro-
vide more specific human capital (as both theory
and the empirical work on turnoverpresentedbelow
suggest), then these results imply that small firms
•• 19 .,
provide more general trammg. The momtonng-
14This framework can be used to model various
discrete events. For example, to model job turn-
over, let the rate ofleaving employment for the jth
person be given by rjk , where k is the destination
state, and k=I indicates being fired or laid offand
k=2 indicates quitting. We assume that the turnover
rate depends on the type and size of the ernployer
and various control variables:
Dij = a dummy variable indicating afirm
ofsize and type i.
C j = a vectorofcontrol variables including
those described in Appendix A and, in
addition, I-digit SIC industry dummies. cO
The As and Bs are parameters to be estimated.
In this model, the rate of leaving employment
depends on whether the person quits or was fired,
the characteristicsofthe individual, and the size and
type ofthe person's employer. cl
The vector of parameters in equation (5) can be
cost hypothesis predicts higher skill levels, more
specific training and less general training in large
firms. Thus, these results confirmthe predictions of
the monitoring-cost hypothesis.
Analysis ofTurnoverRates
Since the monitoring-cost hypothesis predicts
more specific humancapital in large firms, turnover
rates should be smaller. To determine if turnover
rates depend on firm size and type, models deter-
mining the (instantaneous) transition rates between
employment and leaving that employment (either
finding new employment or not working) are
estimated.
The instantaneous rateofan eventoccurring, ret),
is the limit, as dt approaches zero, ofthe probabil-
ity of the event occurring between t and t+~t
[pet, t+dt)]perunit oftime:
ret) = lim P(t,t+~t) (4)
dt-~o dt
If ret) were constant over time, then the expected
duration until the event occurs would be Ifr and the
duration until the event occurs would be distributed
exponentially.
Inrjk = Aok + Ak Cj + B Ik DIj + Bck Dei
+ B 1k D 1j + B4kD4j
where,
(5)
IS16estimated by the method of maximum likelihood
using individual data on observed lengths of em-
ployment spells.
22 The observed length ofemploy-
ment (in a particular job) equals the last time the
person is employed (either when the person leaves
his or herjob or when the observation period ends)
minus the time the person is first employed in that
job (orJuly I, 1979, depending on which is later).
In Table 3, we present the results ofa simplified
version of the model described by equation (5) in
which there is only one destination state-leaving
the currentjob. Mean annual turnover rates (from a
rate model with only a constant term) show that
turnover rates are relatively high in our sample,
ranging from .39 per year for men to l.51 per year
for youth. Since the inverse of the turnover rate
gives the expected duration at that particular job,
these numbers imply lengths of employment at a
particular job ranging from 2.56 years for married
men to .66 years for youth. 23
The results in this table strongly suggest that
small businesses have much higher turnover rates
than large businesses, government, or the self-
employed. Forexample, for married men, turnover
rates are 44 percent less in large businesses than
small businesses, and for single female heads they
are 58 percent less. The only type ofemployer that
has higher turnover rates than small private firms is
special government programs, which is not surpris-
ing given that the intention ofthese programs is to
provide short-term employment. These results also
suggest that turnover rates are not, in general,
significantly different among the government, the
self-employed, and large private businesses.
In Table 4, we present the coefficients of the
turnover model described by equation (5), which is
identical to the model in Table 3exceptthat quits are
distinguished from lay-offs. Sample sizes are some-
what lower because some observations lacked in-
formation on why a job ended. The results suggest
that for all demographic groups, quit rates are con-
siderably higher than fire/lay-off rates, with the
smallest differences for married men and the largest
differences for youth. These results also suggest
that large private businesses have lower quit rates
and lower fire/lay-off rates than small businesses,
with somewhat larger differences for quit rates.
Both the self-employed and large private busi-
nesses generally have lower quit and fire/lay-off
rates than small businesses. Not unexpectedly, the
17government has lower fire/lay-off rates than large
private businesses.
The results in Tables 3 and 4 are consistent with
the hypothesis that large private firms providemore
specific training than small businesses. Since spe-
cific human capital is fully depreciated when a
worker leaves, both the firm and the workerhave an
incentive to avoid this potential loss of wealth.
Much smaller turnover rates for large firms are
consistent with the notion that large firms provide
more specific on-the-job training than small firms.
Also, we find that small firms generally have the
highest turnover rates ofall five categories offirms
analyzed. This suggests that very little specific
human capital is accumulated by workers in small
firms.
However, the fact that the self-employed have
significantly lowerturnoverrates than employeesof
small businesses indicates that owners ofSmall bus-
inesses are much less likely to quit and close their
businesses than the employees ofsmall businesses
are likely to leave-. This is consistentwith the notion
that many owners ofsmall businesses have substan-
tial specific capital, both human and physical, in-
vested in their businesses.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
After controlling for industry type and a large
number ofindividual characteristics, we find strik-
ing differences in wage levels and turnover among
different-sized firms. Large private businesses pay
significantly higher wages than small private busi-
nesses. However, no significant differences are
found between the rates of wage growth of large
and small businesses. This suggests that large pri-
vate firms are hiring more highly skilled workers,
both in termsofmeasurable and unmeasurable char-
acteristics, than small private firms, and that the
observed wage differences are due to differences in
levels ofhuman capital, not differences in the rate
ofaccumulation. This is consistent with the hypoth-
esis that large firms hire more highly skilled work-
ers because such workers have lower monitoring
costs (per unit of output). The finding that large
firms also have significantly lower turnover than
small firms supports the hypothesis that large finns
have more rigid and specializedmethods ofproduc-
tion and therefore provide more on-the-jobtraining.
These results taken together provide strongsupport
for the hypothesis that, even holding constant in-
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dustry, occupation and various individual charac-
teristics, employment practices depend strongly on
firm size.
To summarize, large firms hire more highly
skilled workers and consequently pay higher
wages, provide more specific on-the-job training,
provide less general on-the-job training, and retain
their workers much longer than small firms. Sto-
chastic models offirm size (taken at face value)are
not consistent with these systematic differences
among firms ofdifferent sizes. Thus, the results in
this paper support the monitoring-cost hypothesis.
The evidence supports the notion that firm size
does matter-that firm size is the result ofa deter-
ministic process depending on the distribution of
managerial or entrepreneurial talents, the eco-
nomics ofa hierarchical organization ofproduction
within firms and the costs of monitoring workers'
performance. This model ofthe firm also explains
the skewed distributions offirm size within indus-
tries, why large and small firms coexist, and sug-
gests that there may be economic losses associated
with public policies that prohibit finns from attain-
ing theiroptimum size.occupation Characteristics
Dummy for union member
Dummyfor occupation executive/administration
Dummy foroccupation engineer/scientist/doctor
Dummy for occupation teacher/librarian
Dummy for occupation health technician/
nurse/pharmacist
Dummy for occupation marketing/sales
Dummyfor occupation clerical
Dummy for occupation service
Dummy for occupation transportation
Dummy for occupation mechanical
Dummy for occupation production
Dummy for occupation not known because person
was not working when occupation question was
asked (excluded occupations include material
handler, technologists, writer/artist, and any
unknown occupations)
Income and Labor Force Characteristics
Dummy for not working first halfof 1979
Dummy for receiving AFDC first halfof 1979
Dummy for receiving VI first halfof 1979
Dummy for receiving Food Stamps first halfof 1979
Non-Labor income first halfof 1979
Ap~ndixA
Control Variables Employed in theWage-Level Regression
Site Characteristics
Large SMSAdummy (population over 1million)




Dummy for spell being truncated by the end
ofthe period
Durationofthe spell
Dummy for spell being truncated at 7-1-79
Dummy for jobcomingfrom 2-job file
Dummy for jobbeing continued from prior spell
Demographic Characteristics
Race dummy for Black
Race dummy for Hispanic
Low-income strata dummy (from EOPPsurvey)
Age in years
Numberofpersons in the family
Human Capital Variables
Disability dummy for disability that limits
the amountofwork
Numberofyears ofschool
Numberofyears worked since age 17
'Numberofyears worked squared
FOOTNOTES
1. There is also concern aboutthe concentrationofpolitical
poweras well as the distributionofincomethatwould result
from such concentration.
2. For example, it is widely believed that public utilities
repres~nt naturalmonopolies, which, if unregulated, would
. restrictoutputand charg.e higherprices to consumers. \...>............................. . .
3. For example, the government's IBM case was brought
primarilybecauseofIBM'slargemarketshare in mainframe
computers.
4.•S~e LesterThurow, "Abolish the Antitrust Laws," Dun's
Re;;ie~ (February 1981, p. 72.)
5. Seeaaumol(1982) for a recent discussion of industry
structurei~hat emphasizes the technology of production.
Viner (1932) originally developed this theory of market
structure.
6. Data arefrom the first wave ofthe employer surveythat
was performed as part oftheevaluation of the Employment
Opportunity Pilot Projects (EOPP). See Section IV for a
description ofthe data.
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7. In the datasetanalyzed, the 4-digit SIC code resulted in
548 differentcategories of firms (i.e., industries) out of a
sample of 5271 observations.
8. SeeStiglehifl958), Simon and Bonini (1958), Hoit aha
Prais (1956), anq Ijiri and Simon (1964).
9. Studies by HartandPrais(1956), Sim()n .and Bonini
(1958), Quandt (1966) and Ijiri and Simon (1964) all show
that thedistribution of firm-size within specific industries is
skewed. Analysis ofthe EOPP data indicates that the firm-
sizeskewness in banking is lessthan most, butnotall, other
industries defined at the 2...digit SIC level.
10. This framework has been used by Pencavel (1972) to
explain differences in turnover rates.
11. That is the marginal product that could be achieved if
no time were devoted to training. Opportunity marginal
products themselves depend, ofcourse, on the accumula-
tion ofboth general and specific human capital.
12. Another reason why observed wages may differ
among firms is because ofdifferences in the nonpecuniaryconditions of work. For example, Masters (1969) has
argued that large firms have to pay higher wages because
of their more rigid and inflexible working schedules. How-
ever, one can think of many cases where the working
environment is superiorin large firms.
13. EOPP was designed to test a structured job-search
program combined with a work and training program that
was a key part of President Carter's welfare reform pro-
posal. The program began in some sites on a very Umited
basis in the summer of 1979 but was not into full operation
until the summer of 1980. The program never reached the
scaleofoperation originally intended and was soon phased
out during 1981 under the Reagan Administration. How-
ever, the operations and purpose of this program are not
pertinent to this study in which only preprogram data are
analyzed.
14. An important characteristic of the sample is that the
period covered by the interview (January 1, 1979 through
June 1, 1980, on average) is artificially divided into a six-
month "control" period from January 1, 1979 through June
30, 1979, and an analysis period from July 1, 1979through
the end ofthe interview. This is donebecausethestatistical
models employed in this paper are based on the assump-
tion that variables measured during the first six-month per-
iod are exogenous with respect to the dependent variables
that are analyzed during the second period. If such vari-
ables were calculated during the analysis period it might be
difficultto inferthe direction ofcausaUty.
15. In this study, firm size is from the employer survey.
Sinceall firms with 500 ormoreemployeeswere includedin
the sample frame of the employer survey, it is possible to
determinefirm sizefortheemployersofall individuals inthe
household survey by inference. Thus, samples are many
times larger than they would have been were we to restrict
the analysis to only matching cases. Only 6,788 jobs in the
household survey were matched to the employer survey
out of approximately 35,000 jobs. For all matching cases,
firm size is taken directly from the employer survey and for
all non-matches firm size can be inferred to be less than
500, assuming that the matchingwas d urately. For
matching cases, firm size istakenfromth oyersurvey
sample records, which contain informa .) n the .entire
sample frame ofemployers in the sites c0rllrll0n to both the
household and employersurveys regardlessofwhetherthe
employer survey was actually completed.
16. Since InwDi=l - InwDi=O = Bi, the exponentialof the
coefficient is the ratio of the wage when Oi = 1to thewage
when Oi = O. That is,
20
[
WOi - 1J WOi = 1 In ---- B or--- = exp B,·
WOi = 0 "wOi = 0
17. In addition to these sorts of control variables there are
also variables that hold constant various ways in which the
observations were created. There is control for left- and
right-censoring of the spell whether the job was continued
from a previous spell, whether the job was from the 2-job
spell file (indicating that the person held 2 jobs at least part
of the time during which the job in question is being anal-
yzed), and whether this job was a second job (indicating
that two jobs were held and that the job being analyzed is
less important in terms of hours worked).
18. Workers in large private firms also earn more than
government workers orself-employed workers.
19. Schiller (1982) finds that workers in small firms have
more rapid rates ofwage growth thanworkers in largefirms
for new entrants to the labor force. This evidence is also
consistent with the notion that small firms provide more
general training.
20. Two digit SIC industry dummies were not used in the
analysis ofturnover because ofcomputational cost.
21. This equation is based on a number of assumptions.
For example, it assumesthatthe explanatoryvariables and
their coefficients do not vary over time, that the rate of
leaving employment does not depend on the length oftime
ofemployment, thatthe rate ofleaving onespell is indepen-
dent of characteristics of previous spells and that unob-
served variables do not affect the rate (heterogeneity). By
including a large number of variables in C, we hope to
accountforsome of these effects.
22. If we define ej to equal one if individual j is observed
leaving his orher job due to being fired or laid off and zero
otherwise, 0 jto equal one if individual j is observed leaving
his or her job due to quitting, and zero otherwise and then
the likelihood function, assuming independence among
length ofspells, may be written as:
L = 11 [rli H(tj)] ej [r2j H(9] oj [H(tj)] 1-8j-oj
J=l
where H(tj) exp [-rljtj - r2jti)
is the probability the individual is still employed at the
job at time tj is the length of the observed spell. Maxi,. za-
tion of L with respect to the Bs from the above eqyation
gives the maximum Ukelihood estimates of the •••Bs. F9r.
further details on the structure of this model, see Turlla
(1976), Tuma and Robins (1980), or Tuma, Hannan, and
Groeneveld (1979).
23. Very high turnover rates for youth are onereasonII'Ihy
youth have such high observed unemployment rates.REFERENCES
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